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Abstract
This paper begins by exploring the place of laughter in the
characterization of the human being and how it is related to rea-
son. It then examines the attitudes towards laughter in Buddhism;
from the prohibitions on laughter concerning monks, to the laugh-
ing Buddha.
Human beings are the only animals that laugh. Other animals are
perhaps too serious to laugh, or they are too preoccupied with their living
and finding enough to eat to laugh, or perhaps they do not have the physi-
ological capability to laugh. Or perhaps the two go together, as the emo-
tional sensitivity that would enable an animal to laugh and its physiologi-
cal makeup go hand in hand. But that is in fact a matter for biology, of
which I do not claim any expertise. That laughing is a uniquely human
characteristic has been recognized since ancient times. The medieval West
sometimes characterized human beings, as animals that can laugh. The
quality of risibility is as unique to our species as does rationality. We
human beings are both rational animals and risible animals.
That rationality and risibility are equally properties which charac-
terize the human being gives rise to a thought. Perhaps it is the case that
all rational beings are risible beings, and vice versa. But if this is indeed
the case, then rationality and risibility may be closer to each other than
previously thought. In any case, philosophical reflections on what uniquely
identifies human beings have tended to focus almost exclusively on ratio-
nality and not much at all on its counterpart. Rationality is the foundation
of logic, which underpins systematic communication and thought. It is
filled with seriousness and accorded with respectability to such an extent
that to claim that one is not rational would be to suggest that one is not a
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human being. Risibility, on the other hand, has been consigned to the
realm of the ‘laughable’, that is, the realm of frivolity, playfulness, light-
ness-in short anything that is opposite to the weighty seriousness that
characterizes rationality. What is rather surprising is that when one says
of a human being that she does not possess the quality of risibility, one
does not appear to be claiming, ceteris paribus, that the person in ques-
tion is not a human being. On the contrary, to say of someone that she
lacks the quality of risibility would even seem to be an act of commending
her for her seriousness and its associated qualities, such as dependability,
earnestness, punctuality, and so on. As rationality and risibility are equally
unique human characteristics, this disparity in the attitude toward the two
must be pointing toward something that lies deeper in the collective psyche
regarding the attitude toward frivolousness and playfulness.
It is therefore not surprising that philosophical reflection on, and
academic study of laughter and laughing behavior are much neglected.
Philosophers tend to be a serious type; one has the image of such person-
alities as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, or Hegel,
none of whom is known for their playfulness and frivolity. Rationality
underlies logic, but exactly what does risibility underlie? Is there some
counterpart to logic, in the same way as rationality and risibility are coun-
terparts, that serves as the systematic account of risibility in the same way
as logic is the account of rationality? One might then talk of the ‘logic’ of
risibility, the ‘logic of laughter’. But then this phrase could itself provoke
a lot of laughter, for, as the theorists of comedy were wont to say, laugh-
ter originate from an incongruous juxtaposition of things that normally
do not go together; hence to put logic and laughter together would per-
form the same function as a successful comedy show. Nonetheless, a se-
rious look at laughter and laughing would presumably shed light on our
predicaments. I said a serious look because, for one thing, there is the
academic constraint of an essay, which precludes my treatment of the
topic as a full-scale comedy. And for another, perhaps the objective de-
tachment which is the hallmark of a philosophical essay would ironically
be an appropriate venue for treatment of laughing, in the same way the
audience laugh at a comedy as they do not identify themselves with the
characters in the play, when they feel that they are safely detached from
the slapstick pyrotechnics that take place on stage (or in the film, or on
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the television screen). Hence there is a reason to treat of laughter as an
object of philosophical reflection. The question is to find out why this
uniquely human characteristic fares so badly in philosophy and in the wider
academic circles.
According to one of the few philosophical studies of laughter,
John Morreall recounts a number of theories on the topic.1  The first and
oldest one is the “Superiority Theory”. According to the theory, laughter
occurs as a result on one’s feeling superior to the other, who is the object
of laughter. The typical English expression on this kind of laughter is to
laugh at someone. For such philosophers as Plato, laughter often occurs
when one feels superior to those who think themselves to be wise, good
looking, or virtuous, while in fact they are not so. It is a kind of feeling of
one's knowing better than the one who is laughed at; however, Plato
maintains that this is actually a kind of vice, a malice toward those who
are the object of laughter. Furthermore, Aristotle, while acknowledges
that laughter is part of the good life, nonetheless warns that laughter
could get people carried away too far when they say jokes designed to
evoke laughter, which for Aristotle is always targeted at somebody, and
hence those laughing are being inconsiderate toward those who are being
laughed at.
The other main theory of laughter is the Incongruity Theory.
Laughter occurs as a result of a humorous incident in which incongruous
things happen together, evoking the feeling of being funny. Suppose some-
body is walking on the street, and steps on a banana peel and suddenly
performs a somersault. We laugh because of the incongruous nature of
the situation. This is not necessary a result of our feeling superior to the
unfortunate who is doing the somersault, but the situation itself is a hu-
morous one. There is the usual conceptual pattern which we normally
associate with the act of walking, but sudden somersault is not part of it,
hence the incongruity.
However, even though the Incongruity Theory seems to do more
justice to laughter, it does not necessarily entail that philosophers in gen-
eral will accept laughter. Morreall lists three major objects against laugh-
ter in Western philosophy, which he names the Hostility, the Irrationality,
and the Irresponsibility Objections. The first objection takes place when
one who laughs is usually hostile toward one being laughed at. Hence
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laughter according to the Superiority Theory is indicative of a hostile
situation, one where people feel competitive to one another. When one
falls down having stepped on a banana peel, one is being laughed at be-
cause other people feel that they are more fortunate in that it is not they
who are falling. This feeling is an opposite of envy. One is envious toward
another when one senses that the latter is better than oneself; however,
when one feels that one is better than the other, one laughs. Furthermore,
the Irrationality Objection holds that laughter is objectionable because it
is irrational. For Plato, laughter is a kind of emotion, and as such it de-
serves at best a second tier among the hierarchy described in the Repub-
lic. Reason is to reign supreme and laughter has no place there because it
is always making fun of reason. The third objection, the Irresponsibility
Objection, holds that laughter is non-serious, and hence does not deserve
a place either in Plato’s Republic or anywhere else for that matter. That is
why Aristotle said: “serious things are intrinsically better than humorous
things or those connected with amusement, and the activity of the better
of two things-whether two men or two parts or faculties of a man-is the
more serious (quoted in Morreall, Rejection of Humor)”.2  Laughter is
objectionable because it is an irresponsible act. One who laughs typically
looks at things in a playful mode, and it is likely, according to the objec-
tion, that one who operates in this mode is not to be trusted with any
important tasks. Morreall cites a situation where one’s car is stuck in a
muddy ditch, if, instead of seriously trying to get the car out of the mud,
one laughs at the spinning wheels and the revving engine, then presum-
ably one is not being serious in getting the car out of the undesirable
situation.
These philosophical attitudes toward laughter, moreover, do not
happen only in the West. It is also there in the philosophical traditions of
the East, and the attitudes deserve no less attention than its Western coun-
terpart. Buddhism has a very interesting attitude toward laughter, even
though the topic is not treated fully in the canonical text. An image that
one in the West recalls to mind when one hears the word ‘Buddha’ is that
of a fat, kind and laughing monk. So there seems to be at least a connec-
tion between the Buddha and laughing, even though such a connection
may be based on not much more than popular imagination based on cer-
tain types of Buddha images. Nonetheless, something must be there al-
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ready as a source of the popular imagination. Perhaps there is a more
intimate connection between laughter and the Buddha. The core teaching
of Buddhism, the doctrine of Emptiness (sunyata), claims that nothing
whatsoever is imbued with inherent existence. So the Buddhas and
bodhisattvas laugh as part of the playfulness that regards all things as
insubstantial and fleeting-the laugh of those who are utterly liberated from
the bondage of the samsaric world.
I
Buddhism is not always like this, however, The original canonical
text of Buddhism, the Tipitaka, does not speak much of laughter, and
when it does, it treats of laughter as something to be avoided by the
monks. The Vinaya, the part of the Tipitaka that deals with the monastic
code, has an injunction against laughing, especially if the laugh occurs in
the neighborhood of a household. According to the Vinaya, the monk
should not open up their robes, laugh loudly, rock himself to and fro near
a household, because that would invite disrespect to the monks.  Another
injunction is against monks who tickle fellow monks.3 Usually in the Vinaya
whenever the Buddha declared a monastic rule, there was a story behind
the declaration that led him to lay down the rule. One day a monk named
Chabbaggiya played with a fellow monk by tickling the latter with his
fingers. The fellow monk laughed so much that he hyperventilated and
died. When the Buddha learned about the incident, he reproached
Chabbaggiya and laid down the rule that monks were not to tickle their
fellow monks with their fingers.
In the Sutras, which were the main body of the Buddha’s teach-
ing, there are also a few places where laughter in mentioned. In the
Talaputta Sutta,4 the Buddha was repeatedly asked by a dancer and a
musician named Talaputta about the consequences of dancing and music
making and making other people laugh. He told the Buddha that he had
heard his former teacher say to him that those who did something like this
would be reborn in the company of the mirthful god Pahasa. Talaputta
would like to know from the Buddha whether what he had heard was
true. At first the Buddha did not want to answer this question, but after
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being asked by Talaputta as many as three times, the Buddha said that it
was wrong that such dancers and musicians who made others laugh through
words which were sometimes true and sometimes false would be reborn
in heaven with the god Pahasa. Instead, the Buddha said, those dancers
and musicians would be reborn either in hell or as animals. When Talaputta
heard the Buddha’s words, he cried. The Buddha then said to him that he
should not have asked him about the consequences of the action of such
dancers and musicians. Talaputta then told him that the reason why he
was crying was not because he was sad that these dancers would actually
have to go to hell or the animal realm, but because he was deceived by his
fellow dancers and musicians as well as his former teachers that such
dancers and musicians would be reborn in heaven. Talaputta appreciated
the Buddha’s teaching so much that he compared the teaching with “turn-
ing over things which have been closed down, opening things that have
been closed, telling the way to a blind person with the intention that those
who have eyes would see the way”. He then asked the Buddha to give
him permission to become a monk and eventually become an arhat, or
one who is liberated so that he will not be reborn.5
The point of the story is that it is wrong for one to cause another
to laugh. Chabbaggiya was rebuked by the Buddha for his playfulness and
mischievousness. Many texts in the Vinaya were about Chabbaggiya laugh-
ing out loud so that others could see all his teeth, or causing a commotion
in the village with his loud shouts, or rocking himself to and fro.6  As a
result of Chabbaggiya’s acts, the Buddha banned all laughing in the vicin-
ity of the lay householders altogether, except only in the case of illness,
being unaware, only smiling not letting others to see the teeth, and losing
one’s mind. He also banned shouting out loud and rocking oneself to and
fro. For the monks these actions are not conducive to a good behavior of
a monk, which should always be focused toward realizing the goal of
Enligtenment, and as Chabbaggiya’s action shows, these actions do not
seem to be so conducive. Moreover, monks who laugh out loud and shout
very loudly in the presence of the lay householders might cause the latter
to lose respect for the monks themselves.
In the Talaputta Sutta, the message seems to be that dancers,
musicians, actors and the like are quite likely to be reborn in the lower
realms as a result of their action. Causing others to laugh through “false
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or true words” quite clearly means to provide entertainment to others
through imaginative and creative works such as story telling and play-
acting. These are not encouraging words to the actors, dramatists and
poets at all. One is reminded of Plato’s banishment of actors and poets
out of the Republic. The reason given by the Buddha why the actors and
playwrights will go to the lower realms was that the action of these danc-
ers and actors caused the audience to have defilements that they did not
have before. Before they watched the play, for example, they were not
desirous, angry, or deluded (which are the three main defilements that
prevent one from attaining Liberation), but only became so after watch-
ing it. They were “caused to laugh through true or untrue words”, and
when they laughed they presumably lost their control over their minds
and became enslaved by the defilements and the passions. Hence, the
Buddha said that the dancers, musicians, and actors who caused others to
have these defilements incurred bad karma through their action.
The attitude reflected in the Sutta toward laughter is quite clear.
Laughter is just a step away from being born again in hell or the animal
realm. Monks are not permitted to laugh out loud (smiles that do not
expose the teeth were all right). This is because when one laughs, one
seems to be mired in the net of the defilements. The pleasure of laughing,
then, is part and parcel of sensual delight and desires, none of which is
conducive to the realization of Liberation, or nirvana.
It is thus rather perplexing how this negative attitude toward laugh-
ter could fit with the popular image of what is usually thought of as the
laughing Buddha.7  If laughing is indeed to be avoided, then why is the
Buddha himself laughing? In a later text in the Mahayana tradition,8 the
Lankavatara Sutra (Discourse on the Descent to Lanka), which is about
the doctrines of Mind Only and Emptiness, there is the following pas-
sage. The Buddha was laughing very loudly after learning that Ravana,
the Lord of Lanka, understood the profound meaning of the Teaching:
Then the Blessed One beholding again this great assembly
with his wisdom-eye, which is not the human eye, laughed
loudly and most vigorously like the lion-king. Emitting
rays of light from the tuft of hair between the eyebrows,
from the ribs, from the loins, from the Srivatsa [svastika]
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on the breast, and from every pore of the skin, __emitting
rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place
at the end of a kalpa, like a luminous rainbow, like the
rising sun, blazing brilliantly, gloriously-which were ob-
served from the sky by Sakra, Brahma, and the guardians
of the world, the one who sat on the peak [of Lanka] vy-
ing with Mount Sumeru laughed the loudest laugh....9
Compare this with Chabbagiya’s laugh and there is a world of
difference. Of course Chabbagiya is an ordinary monk and the Buddha is
the Enlightened One. But what is important for us here is the attitude
toward laughter shown in the two texts. In the Pali Vinaya and in the
Talaputta Sutta, laughter is seen to be something that should be avoided.
It opens the floodgate of emotions which could lead one astray toward
surrendering oneself to the defilements. The Buddha, however, “laughs
the loudest laugh” and “most vigorously like the lion-king”,10 and emits
“rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place at the end of
a kalpa”. The difference could not be greater. The Buddha’s laughter,
however, is not the kind that could lead him to the door of defilements.
The Buddha is utterly pure and is utterly free from such lowly possibili-
ties. His laugh is a resplendent, confident one, the laughter of one who
has completely destroyed all possibilities of even the slightest and most
subtle of the defilements. It is the expression of one who is full of com-
passion and love, a reflection of pure, transcendent happiness.11
But if this is so, then laughter in itself is not to blame. The empha-
sis of the early teaching found in the Pali Tipitaka and the monastic code
is on training of newly ordained monks. It makes sense to guard against
monks laughing, rocking themselves to and fro and tickling fellow monks,
because the purpose of monks is to study and to train oneself on the path
laid down by the Buddha leading toward eventual Liberation. In the
Talaputta Sutta, the Buddha told the musician and dancer who asked him
repeatedly that the lower realms awaited them because they were leading
their audience away from the Path. Causing others to laugh through true
and untrue words was censured because it prevents Liberation to them.
Here laughter is accompanied with allowing oneself to be indulged in the
sensual pleasures of the samsaric world, but as we have just seen in the
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Buddha’s own case, laughter does not have to be so accompanied, as the
Buddha himself laughs.
Back to the Lankavatara Sutra, when the Buddha laughs out loud,
the great assembly of Bodhisattvas question why:
... At that time the assembly of the Bodhisattvas together
with Sakra and Brahma, each thought within himself:
“For what reason, I wonder, from what cause does
the Blessed One who is the master of all the world
(sarva-dharma-vasavartin), after smiling first, laugh
the loudest laugh? Why does he emit rays of light
from his own body? Why, emitting [rays of light],
does he remain silent, with the realisation [of the
Truth] in his inmost self, and absorbed deeply and
showing no surprise in the bliss of Samadhi, and
reviewing the [ten] quarters, looking around like
the lion-king, and thinking only of the discipline,
attainment, and performance of Ravana?”
At that time, Mahamati the Bodhisattva-
Mahasattva who was previously requested by
Ravana [to ask the Buddha concerning his self-
realisation], feeling pity on him, and knowing the
minds and thoughts of the assembly of the
Bodhisattvas, and observing that beings to be born
in the future would be confused in their minds be-
cause of their delight in the verbal teaching
(desanapanha), because of their clinging to the let-
ter as [fully in accordance with] the spirit (artha),
because of their clinging to the disciplinary pow-
ers of the Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philoso-
phers, __which might lead them to think how it were
that the Tathagatas, the Blessed Ones, even in their
transcendental state of consciousness should burst
out into loudest laughter __Mahamati the
Bodhisattva asked the Buddha in order to put a
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stop to their inquisitiveness the following ques-
tion: “For what reason, for what cause did this
laughter take place?”
Said the Blessed One: “Well done, well done,
Mahamati! Well done, indeed, for once more,
Mahamati! Viewing the world as it is in itself and
wishing to enlighten the people in the world who
are fallen into a wrong view of things in the past,
present, and future, thou undertakest to ask me
the question. Thus should it be with the wise men
who want to ask questions for both themselves
and others. Ravana, Lord of Lanka, O Mahamati,
asked a twofold question of the Tathagatas of the
past who are Arhats and perfect Buddhas; and he
wishes now to ask me too a twofold question in
order to have its distinction, attainment, and scope
ascertained-this is what is never tasted by those
who practise the meditation of the Sravakas,
Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers; and the same
will be asked by the question-loving ten-headed
one of the Buddhas to come”.12
The Buddha answered Mahamati that the reason he was laughing
was because Ravana asked him questions in order to understand the teach-
ing further, which shows that he was on the correct path. In short the
Buddha laughed out of his satisfaction and his being pleased that Ravana,
the King of Lanka, understood the heart of the teaching. These questions,
said the Buddha, will be asked by those who will themselves become
Buddhas in the eons to come. Hence he is immensely pleased, and those
who are aware of the basic Mahayana doctrine would know that, in order
for one to become a Buddha, one has to undertake the vow of bodhicitta,
which means one commits oneself to practice in order to become a Bud-
dha so that one is fully empowered to help sentient beings out of the
sufferings of the samsaric world. When one has bodhicitta, any action
that one does, every movement, every breath one takes, will be for the
sake of other sentient beings. Santideva said in the Bodhicaryavatara
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that all the Buddhas in the past have taken the bodhicitta vow, and all
future Buddhas will also do the same.13  Seeing the King of Lanka com-
mitting himself to learning and understanding the Dharma, the Buddha is
thus very happy because he sees in Ravana an awakening of bodhicitta,
which will eventually lead him to become himself a Buddha.
II
What does it mean, then, to be a Buddha? It means one who com-
pletely sees reality as it is with no distortion whatsoever. Here is where
the relation between language and reality comes in. In seeing things com-
pletely as they are without any distortion or fabrication, a Buddha real-
izes that language itself is a distorting medium, and that there is no way
getting around it. The distortion is built into the inner mechanism of lan-
guage itself. In Mulamadhayamakakarika, a seminal text written by
Nagarjuna, the emphasis is precisely on this point. Nagarjuna attempts to
lay down in a systematic manner what it means for things to be “empty of
their inherent nature”. In other words, Nagarjuna in this work presents an
exposition and a system of arguments for the Doctrine of Emptiness.
Basically what the doctrine says is that things as they normally take them
to be, i.e., as things with some kind of inner characteristics that identify
them to be what it is, are what they are only by virtue of their being
essentially dependent on their environment and on other things. Nothing
stands alone and derives their being solely through itself.
In short, Nagarjuna argues that language never adequately repre-
sents reality. Western philosophers will immediately be familiar with this
conclusion. For a typical Western mind, this is reminiscent of idealism,
the idea that the mind never captures reality fully, and as a result the mind
somehow constructs its own “reality”, which only approximates reality
as it is in itself. However, Nagarjuna presents a series of arguments show-
ing that such is not the case. The Buddhist Doctrine of Emptiness is not
guilty of being an idealistic position, if that is taken to be the position that
the mind constructs its own reality. The reality for Nagarjuna is no more
or less than the empirical reality that we interact with everyday.Things
are empty of their inherent nature when their being depend on others, and
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their dependence on other beings also show that they are empty of their
inherent nature.
Perhaps the key passage where Nagarjuna discusses this empty
nature of things is the following:
That which is dependent origination
Is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation,
Is itself the middle way.14
Things that are dependently originated are said to be empty. That
is to say, they lack their inherent nature as to ascertain that they are the
things they are and nothing else. This alone might not sound so surprising
for Western philosophers. However, Nagarjuna is actually saying that what-
ever we language users designate a certain thing to be what it is, perhaps
when we designate this clump of matter as a glass, we are employing our
conceptual apparatus which consists of words that serve to distinguish
instances of the meaning of the words from everything else. Thus, when
we say of something that it is a glass, we immediately block out some
other things not to be a glass and when we say of another thing it is also
a glass we presuppose some common characteristics that enable us to
agree that this is also a glass. For Nagarjuna, all this is conceptual fabrica-
tion. However, Nagarjuna’s position is not to be conflated with that of
Immanuel Kant, who distinguishes between the known phenomenon and
the unknowable noumenon. For Kant, the noumenon is there in objective
reality, functioning as a foundation for objectivity. For Nagarjuna, on the
other hand, what is understood by Kant to be the noumenon itself is also
“empty”. There is nothing over and above conceptual fabrications; every-
thing that we designate as such and such is in fact what it appears to the
conceptualizing mind. There is nothing deeper than the appearances. One
becomes liberated from sufferings when one realizes that there is nothing
deeper, when one, that is, knows that things are what they are only in
virtue of their dependence on others. And an important aspect of the
dependence is that of the things as they are on conceptual designation.
The difference with Kant is that for Nagarjuna there is no bedrock reality
which one conceptualizes and designates. The act of conceptualization
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and designation itself is part of the empty nature of the total reality. Thus,
dependent origination is but one way emptiness is characterized. Empti-
ness itself, then, is said to be “a dependent designation”, and is itself the
“middle way”. It is a middle way between the two extremes of nihilism
and essentialism. The former claims that there is nothing at all, and the
other claims that things have their internal essences. The Buddha refutes
both positions, and thereby releases language from being tied up with
reality. This release does not mean that we are now floating in the air of
non-substantiality and non-objectivity; on the contrary, things, being des-
ignated and understood as they always are, are already there, only that
they are understood ultimately to depend on each other, and their being
what they are is due only to designation.
This is the main difference between the aryas who have attained
the understanding, and the non-aryas, who are yet so to understand. And
when the Buddha laughs, he does so out of the complete understanding
that all things are but appearances and insubstantial. The laugh arises out
of the mind that pervades all corners of reality and is completely filled
with great compassion. It is a laugh that is totally free from any trace of
dualistic thinking. However, when he rebuked Chabbagiya when he came
to the village laughing loudly and rocking himself to and fro, he did so out
of his concern for the order of the monastic community. Prohibiting laugh-
ing out loud so that one bares one’s teeth is part of the training that
monks have to undergo in order to rid them of their lay habits and so that
they become more focused toward the task at hand, which is to practice
the teaching in order to become liberated.
Thus, there are two kinds of laughs. Chabbagiya’s is the kind of
laughing that should be restrained, for Chabbagiya has not liberated him-
self yet. It is a mundane laugh that is confined within the samsaric world.
And when we come to Talaputta’s story, this prohibition against laughing
from within the viewpoint of samsara is more pronounced. The Buddha
told Talaputta that those who dance, sing and act so as to cause others to
laugh would go to the lower realms, but the story is limited only to the
case where the musicians and actors did cause their audience to become
desirous when they are not desirous before or to become angry when
they are not angry before. It does not say anything of the opposite role of
the performing arts in bringing about an eradication of these defilements
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and engendering wisdom in the audience. What would the Buddha say
about that?
III
If laughing in itself is not to blame, as the Buddha himself also
laughs, then acts such as acting in a play, singing, dancing, performing
music and so forth are not to blame in themselves either. For their re-
proachable character is entirely due to the fact that they are used to in-
duce people to turn away from the Teaching. However, in themselves it
seems at least plausible that these performing arts could be used in the
opposite way, that is to bring people to the Teaching. Nowadays in Thai-
land one finds many CD’s coming out which are artistic expressions of
the Buddhist Teaching. A popular CD in Thailand features a rendition of
the Jinapanjara, a very popular protection chant in Pali. In the CD the
text of the chant is set as lyric of a piece of modern music made through
the modern studio production. The music sounds similar to the soft pop
music one usually hears in department stores in Bangkok. Now, if all
musicians who presumably cause their listeners to laugh (or by extension,
cause them to have the pleasure of listening) will go straight to hell or
preta realms after their demise, then these musicians who produced the
Jinapanjara CD will also suffer the same fate. However, it is doubtful
that they will ever suffer that fate; on the contrary, Buddhists believe that
they will go to heaven and will collect their merit so that they will become
liberated themselves in the future. This is a direct result of their very good
karma in producing music that is inducive to people’s turning to the
Dharma. But if this is indeed so, then laughing is not such a bad thing in
Buddhism after all.
In fact the use of art in Buddhism is not a recent phenomenon at
all. Almost from the time of the Buddha himself artists have expressed
their reverence to the Buddha through their arts. Sculptors made likeness
images of the Buddha only a few centuries after the Master’s death, and
there were countless paintings depicting aspects of his lives and those of
the disciples. Poets have written praises of the Master’s teachings and
activities. In Thailand, monks chant the story of Vessantara, the present
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Buddha’s last human rebirth before becoming the Buddha, story which
was very beautifully written and contained all kinds of artistic expres-
sions one can find. Sometimes the monks also gave teachings in the form
of dialogs between two monks, and the content could become rather rowdy
and hilarious, much to the delight, and laughter, of the lay audience. Phra
Phayom Kalyano, a well known abbot in Nonthaburi, Thailand, is well
known for his comic sermons, which are highly sought after items pub-
lished in CD’s and cassette tapes known to every Thai Buddhist.  The
sermons amply show witticisms and jokes that most people love. If the
Buddha’s words to Talaputta are taken too seriously, then, Phra Phayom
himself risks having his next rebirth in the lower realms.
Here is an example of Phra Phayom’s talk:
An Ungrateful Person
One morning I went on an alms round to Grandma Chuen’s
house and saw her own dog attacking her. So I asked,
“Whose dog is this?” Grandma Chuen said, “He’s my dog”.
“Then why is he biting you?” “This is the mating season
and this dog is being attached to a female dog. Perhaps he
thinks I am taking away the bitch from him”, Grandma
said. Now let us look at how powerful lust it. It is so pow-
erful that even a dog become disloyal to its owner. We
human beings are no different. Let’s think about it. When
they become teenagers and begin to have girlfriends [or
boyfriends]. They take their [boyfriends or] girlfriends
home. The mother looks at the friend and thinks that the
girlfriend [or boyfriend] might not be a good one and will
cause troubles to her child. So she tells her child not to
take this one as [boyfriend or] girlfriend. “I don’t like [him
or] her”, says the mother. Only that, and the children just
drive the mother away! “You don’t interfere with my life!”
“It is my business!” Do you see? When they are in heat
they are biting their owners!15
Phra Phayom is a very popular monk who has the rare ability to
mix the Buddha’s serious message with humor. One might say that the
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humor has an auxiliary role in aiding the transmission of the message to
an average Thai teenager, who is always open to a good joke but not
often a Dharma teaching. But perhaps the humor and the laughter it evokes
is not a mere auxiliary; it seems to be an integral part of the message
itself. This does not mean that the message itself, that of the dangers of
sexual desire, incorporates humor and laughter into itself, but the Bud-
dhist message is how to find ways to bring people to understand it such
that they eventually find a way toward ridding themselves of the defile-
ments. Here, then, the humor functions more than a mere mask over the
message. As humor is designed to get a message across to certain types
of audience which would not be receptive otherwise, humor then func-
tions as a “skillful means” (upaya), which is indispensable from the mes-
sage itself. In short, the upaya itself is the message. As laughter and hu-
mor are the upayas that draw the teenage Thais’ attention to Buddhist
teachings, the teachings themselves are also upayas purporting to plant a
seed in the minds of Phra Phayom’s listeners so that one day they would
eventually become enlightened.
The Buddha’s warnings against humor and laughter find analo-
gies with Morreall’s taxonomy of objections against laughter in Western
philosophy. The Buddha warned Chabbagiya against laughing out loud in
the vicity of the lay household because he did not want the lay people to
feel disrespectful toward the monks. Having established the sangha for
only a short time, the Buddha felt that he needed the lay householder’s
support. Here laughing is an act which could bring disrepute to the entire
Sangha community, which sounds like an instance of the Irresponsible
Objection. The Buddha told Talaputta that those who sing and dance will
go to the lower realms because they cause their audience to laugh, so
laughing here means that one loses oneself and opens the mind’s door to
the negative influences of the defilements. Laughing is in this case a way
toward the lower realms and away from Liberation. In any case, the atti-
tude toward laughter looks similar.
Nonetheless, when one comes to the Buddha himself in the
Lankavatara Sutra, the attitude toward laughter changes dramatically, as
we have seen. Phra Phayom’s dharma teachings show that it is possible to
mix humor with serious teaching, and that humor itself functions as a
skillful means. If this is indeed the case, then it is not conceivable that
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Phra Phayom himself will be reborn in a lower realm, since he is accom-
plishing precisely what the Buddha himself would like his disciples to do,
namely to practice the teaching and to spread it across. However, it seems
that Phra Phayom is performing an act designed to provoke laughter,
which according to the Talaputta Sutta is objectionable. Here the solu-
tion can be found in the motivation behind the act. When the Buddha tells
Talaputta that singers and dangers will be reborn in a lower realm, the
context is that these singers and dancers arouse the feelings of defile-
ments (greed, anger, delusion) in the audience. When the Sutta itself is
looked at as a skillful means, then one sees that it is only because one’s
action leads others to cherish the defilements that it will lead him or her to
a lower realm. If it is the intention of those singers and dancers to lead
them toward the defilements, then they will certainly face the consequences.
And even if they perform their act out of professional duty to cause oth-
ers to laugh, but with no intention to use the laughter as a ladder toward
eventual Liberation, then they would quite possible face the same conse-
quences. However, Phra Phayom’s motivation in his joking teachings is
to pave the way toward the Goal for his audience; since this lies outside
the context of Talaputta Sutta, then he is not guilty of leading people
astray and will not go to a lower realm as a result.
If this is indeed the case, then laughter and humor themselves are
not to blame. If one laughs and as a result of that one gains Enlighten-
ment, then by all means laugh. This is supported by the fact that the Bud-
dha himself also laughs. Now let us go back to the text from the
Lankavatara Sutra:
Then the Blessed One beholding again this great assembly
with his wisdom-eye, which is not the human eye, laughed
loudly and most vigorously like the lion-king. Emitting
rays of light from the tuft of hair between the eyebrows,
from the ribs, from the loins, from the Srivatsa [svastika]
on the breast, and from every pore of the skin, __emitting
rays of light which shone flaming like the fire taking place
at the end of a kalpa, like a luminous rainbow, like the
rising sun, blazing brilliantly, gloriously-which were ob-
served from the sky by Sakra, Brahma, and the guardians
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of the world, the one who sat on the peak [of Lanka] vy-
ing with Mount Sumeru laughed the loudest laugh.
The Buddha is looking at the assembly of his followers through
his wisdom eyes, meaning that what he sees is beyond the normal visual
perception, but only through profound understanding of reality. He laughs
loudly like the lion-king. Lion is the king of the jungle; he has no fear
whatsoever and can do anything he pleases, being completely untainted
by guilt or limitations. Laughing the loudest laugh, the Buddha emits
light rays from all the pores of his body, causing the cosmos to shine as
bright as the all consuming fire that engulfs and burns everything at the
end of a cosmic eon. Seeing the world through his wisdom-eye, the Bud-
dha laughs and emits this blazing rays that outshine everything in the
universe.
The laugh and the rays go together. The laugh sends out sounds
throughout all corners of the universe, and the rays do likewise for light.
Usually when the Buddha sends out rays, it is for the sake of helping
sentient beings to realize the truth, as the rays of light dispels the darkness
of ignorance. Seeing that the Ravana is desirous to learn the Dharma, the
Buddha is very pleased and laughs out loud. It is the pleasure of those
who are always intent on helping sentient beings get across the ocean of
samsara where they have been pointlessly born and died many, many times.
Laughter, then, is an expression of the pleasure obtained from seeing
someone realizing the Dharma. The laughter is that of infinite wisdom,
which also expresses itself as the rays of light. Likewise, those who listen
to Phra Phayom’s talks, laugh, and enter the stream toward Liberation
are laughing not at a particular being, but their laughter is a pure one of
one who is about to get on the shore of Liberation.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable that Phra Phayom himself would
have to go to the lower realms, as seems to be implied in the Talaputta
Sutta. Causing others to laugh in this sense is a far cry from the followers
of the god Pahasa who, causing the audience to laugh and to have a good
time, do have to go to the lower realms because they have caused others
to neglect the way toward Liberation and to increase their defilements as
a result. On the contrary, Phra Phayom is not using humor as an end in
itself. He is not a comedian, but he is a monk who is very skillful at telling
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jokes in order to get the audience’s attention so that they being to under-
stand the Dharma. It is indeed true that some of the audience might not be
able to catch the real message, but that is to be expected. Listening to
Phra Phayom’s teaching is still better than being engaged in mere play
and entertainment simply because the teaching is there, which in his talk it
is quite difficult to separate from the upaya of humor and the resultant
laughter. Motivation is everything in the Buddhist thought.
IV
Of course there is a world of difference between the laugh of the
Buddha, and that of an ordinary sentient being after hearing Phra Phayom's
dharma antic. What they share in common, however, is that attitude to-
ward laughing and humor, which is opposite to that found in Plato,
Aristotle, or Hobbes. The Buddha’s injunction against laughing in public
places and his admonition to Talaputta not to ask him the question that
eventually saddens himself arises out of his compassionate mind, seeing
that for those who are just beginning the practice, some restraint against
laughter is sometimes necessary. Everything is an upaya. The Buddha is
not saying that things are thus and so, period. Everything he says is aimed
at helping his listener realize the Path. When he teaches that things are
always changing, it is with the intention to bring the audience to renounce
the world, which is a necessary first stop toward Liberation. When he
teaches that things are dependent on one another, it is also with the same
intention. The reason why the Buddha never states anything categorically
is that if he were to do so, that would run counter to his own teaching of
impermanence and emptiness. Things are empty of their inherent nature.
Consequently, to say of things as if they had fixed characteristics would
run counter to this teaching. If things are empty of their inherent nature,
it would not be possible for words and sentences to fix them. After all,
words and sentences do not have their inherent nature either.
Those who object to laughter typically think that laughter is sub-
versive. When one has constructed some point of view meant to be taken
seriously and accepted as a doctrine, a good laugh at such a construction
destroys its serious intent and its underlying motivation that the point of
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view should be accepted as a general principle. There is little wonder,
then, that in Umberto Eco’s famous novel, The Name of the Rose,16
Aristotle’s lost treatise on comedy would eventually have to be destroyed.
For those who want things to be fixed so that it functions as a fulcrum
point for fixed essence and stable meanings would not be able to tolerate
laughing and humorous jokes since these will peel away the serious fa?ade
of the purportedly stable and fixed essences upon which they would like
to build up a cathedral of secure knowledge. But this is precisely those
things that the Buddha is laughing at. The laugh is not of a kind men-
tioned by Plato, where laughter is always directed at somebody at the
latter’s expense. What the Buddha is laughing at is the folly of believing
and taking seriously those that cannot be taken seriously at all, namely
that language could represent reality in a fixed manner. For the laughing
Buddha, every word is a skillful means. Nothing is meant to convey the
meaning that things are forever thus and so. Things are only ‘thus and so’
if such being ‘thus and so’ succeeds in leading the listener to realize the
Path. One laughs at the humorous incongruity of language and reality, as
an integral part, an expression, of Emptiness itself.17
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